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Jomq E. HAiLLN*
A law that in case of accident to person or property on the
highway due to the operation of a motor vehicle, a person so
operating the vehicle shall stop and upon request shall give his
name, first appears in the Ohio statutes in 1908. The statute,
somewhat revised in 1929, is Section 12606 of the General Code.
No successful challenge of the constitutionality of the act has been
made but it has not received much consideration in the Ohio Su-
preme Court. A municipal court has upheld it,' however, as has
the court of appeals.2
The United States and Ohio Constitutions provide that no per-
son shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. A Cleveland ordinance provided that every person in-
volved in an accident which caused injury to any person or which
resulted in a vehicle becoming disabled should make a full report
to the Cleveland police department. This ordinance was declared
unconstitutional and in violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination in the cases of Rembrandt v. Cieveland,3 and James
v. Cleveland.4 In other jurisdictions, both before and after these
cases it has been quite generally held that no constitutional pro-
vision is violated. The theory in favor of constitutionality is that
under the police power the state and municipalities within its
authority may enact reasonable rules for the safety of the citizens;
that the use of streets for automobiles is a privilege which the
state may grant or deny; and that it may grant such use upon
conditions which will be binding upon all who accept the privi-
lege.5
It is not likely that any serious attack will be made on the
"Hit and Run" Statute at this late date. In fact the Ohio Supreme
Court has said, "There is no issue in this case as to the validity
of the provisions of the ordinance upon which the charge against
the defendant was based. It contains substantially the same provi-
sions as are embodied in Section 12606, General Code .... 6 But
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the Cleveland ordinance which was struck down required a re-
port to the police and the new statute, Section 6298, the Motor-
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, (discussed elsewhere in this
issue) requires a report to the Registrar. Similar statutes have
been upheld in other states,7 and probably will be here, but it is
a hurdle which must be surmounted.
The Ohio statute provides that in case of accident to or colri-
son with persons or property upon the highway, the driver shall
stop and upon request of the person injured or any person, give
his name and address. Most states have statutes to this effect.
Some are almost identical 8 But most of them go further. State v.
Razey, supra note 5, says defendant shall give his name and says
nothing about a request. Ue v. State, supra note 5, says he shall
give his name to the injured party or some one with him. Some
statutes say that he shall give his name to the injured party or a
police officer.9 And some statutes declare that he shall not leave
the scene without making known his true name.10 Many states re-
quire that defendant shall give aid or render assistance.'
Some statutes require that under certain circumstances a re-
port shall be made to a police officer or at a police station. The fol-
lowing are typical: If the injured party is unconscious and there is
no one with him, and there is no police officer in the vicinity, report
must be made to the nearest police station.12 If death or serious in-
jury or other vehicle disabled, report to nearest police station."3 In
case of death or serious injury, report to sheriff or chief of police.' 4
Section 12606 provides that in case of accident or collision the
driver shall stop. There is no qualification that the driver be at
fault. Some statutes specifically say that the driver must stop
whether he be at fault or not. For example: "Regardless of whether
the injury was done through the negligence or carelessness of the
person inflicting the injury."' s Any person who while driving a
motor vehicle, although he may not be at fault, shall strike, wound
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or injure any person."' 6 But even if the statute says no more than
the Ohio Act, and does not discuss fault or the lack of it, the rule
is the same. "It does not matter whether the person leaving the
scene caused the injury by a culpable act, or whether it occurred
through pure accident."' 7 "It will be noted that it matters not
whether the striking of the person was avoidable or unavoidable.'us
"It is clear, we think, the statute here invoked does not contem-
plate that in a prosecution thereunder the court shall be concerned
in determining where the fault lies."' 9
A time-honored distinction in the law of Torts is made be-
tween acts and omissions, between misfeasance and nonfeasance.
Section 322 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts declares: "If
the actor by his tortious conduct has caused such bodily harm
to another as to make him helpless, the actor is under a duty to
use reasonable care to prevent any further harm which the actor
then realizes or should realize as threatening the other." Then
follows: "Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to the
existence or nonexistence of a similar duty to aid or protect one
whom the actor's non-tortious conduct has rendered helpless to
aid or protect himself." It has been held that one who without
fault injures another is under no legal duty to assist him.20 Assum-
ing that for practical consideration, the law will continue to sup-
port the doctrine that there is no affirmative duty to act when there
is no legal relation between the parties, the doctrine seems even
more extreme when the plaintiff's injury was brought about by
the defendant's act even though the defendant was without fault.
It is unlikely that the defendant would long continue to escape
liability in such cases. The beginnings of the breach in the doc-
trine are evidenced here. Failure to stop makes the defendant
liable to punishment though he was without fault in causing the
accident. While these are criminal cases and may be justified on
the argument that acceptance of the privilege of using the high-
way creates the duty, they indicate the modern tendency to im-
pose a duty on the defendant to aid one whom he has injured
regardless of fault.
In the last session of the Legislature, Section 12606-1 was duly
passed and added to the H-it and Run Statute. It provides that the
driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage
to real property or personal property attached thereto, legally on
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or adjacent to a highway, shall stop and take reasonable steps to
notify the owner of such property of the accident and of his name,
address, and registration number of the vehicle, and, upon request
and if available, exhibit his operator's license. If the owner can-
not be found, he shall within twenty-four hours forward the same
information to the sheriff of the county and also give the location
of the accident and a description of the damage.
Section 12606 deals with accident to or collision with persons
or property "upon the highways." Section 12606-1 deals with "an
accident resulting in damage to real property or personal property
attached to such real property." Obviously this adds subject mat-
ter not included in the General Code. Section 12606 declares that
the driver, "having knowledge of such accident or collision, shall
stop and upon request of the person injured or any person, give
such person his name and address . . . ." Section 12606-1 provides
that the driver shall "stop and take reasonable steps to notify the
owner... and of his name and address. .. ." The Ohio Supreme
Court in construing an ordinance similar to Section 12606, has
ruled that there is no legal duty to give his name or identify
himself unless request is made.2' Most statutes in other jurisdic-
tions contain no such limitation. Section 12606-1 requires that he
make a reasonable attempt to notify the owner. Of course the own-
er of real property is less likely to be present at the accident. Yet
the damage is usually much less than in a collision. Section 12606
might well have been amended so as to impose the same duty in
both situations.
In 1929 the Legislature amended the previous statute by add-
ing that it applied to a driver "having knowledge of such accident
or collision." Nothing is said about knowledge in the new Act and
a strict construction of it could hold the defendant liable without
such knowledge, but it is a penal statute and may not be so
strictly construed.
The new Act contains a clause, not found in Section 12606, that
the driver "shall, upon request and if available, exhibit his opera-
tor's or chauffeur's license." The land owner is no police officer
and there may be some doubts as to the justification for this
regulation.
Section 12606-1 provides that if the owner cannot be located,
the driver within twenty-four hours shall forward the same infor-
mation to the sheriff as well as the location of the accident and
description of the damage. There is nothing relating to this in
Section 12606. But Section 6298, the Motor-Vehicle Safety Re-
sponsibility Act, now provides that a driver involved in a motor
21Cleveland v. Jorski, supra note 6.
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vehicle accident shall forward a report to the Registrar -within
five days;2 2 that the Registrar may suspend the license of one who
fails to report;23 and that failure to report may be punished by a
fine not exceeding $100.24 More time is allowed in the Safety Re-
sponsibility Act, and the report is to the Registrar of Motor Ve-
hicles and not the sheriff.
The new Act, Section 12606-1, for injuries to realty, imposes
more requirements and duties upon the motorist than the older
one, Section 12606, for injuries to persons on the highway. But
a return to normalcy is observed when the penalty provisions are
considered. For accidents to or collisions with persons or property
on the highway, the motorist may be fined not more than $200 or
imprisoned in the county jail for not more than six months, or
both. For damage to real property or attached personal property,
the driver may be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned in the
county jail not more than thirty days, or both.
22 OHIo GEN. CODE § 6298-17.
23 OHIo G=T. CODE § 6298-21.
2 4 OHIo GEN. CODE § 6298-85.
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